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1.
J Bus Contin Emer Plan ; 16(4): 335-345, 2023 Jan 01.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2315383

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 public health emergency severely limited the ability of emergency managers to conduct emergency exercises, particularly at the functional or full-scale level. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic response, other emergencies continued, and local emergency management was called to respond, ensuring that local guidelines and COVID-19 restrictions were observed. This paper describes how the pandemic impacted on the City of Puyallup's emergency management training and exercise programme and how the City adapted to conduct a full-scale exercise in the autumn of 2021. Multiple delays, planning partners overwhelmed by COVID-19, and emergencies that occurred prior to the exercise were all addressed and included in the exercise scenario. The City of Puyallup and its planning partners built in contingencies in the run-up to the exercise, all the way through to the day of exercise play. Providing a safe, realistic and timely opportunity for the City of Puyallup and partners to conduct the exercise has resulted in a far-reaching after-action report and improvement plan to guide the preparedness and planning efforts of the City and its partners.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Disaster Planning , Humans , Disaster Planning/methods , Emergencies , Pandemics , COVID-19/epidemiology , Public Health
2.
Health Secur ; 20(4): 339-347, 2022.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2309296

ABSTRACT

The definitive care component of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) may not be able to effectively manage tens of thousands of casualties resulting from a catastrophic disaster incident or overseas conflict. To address this potential national security threat, Congress authorized the US Secretary of Defense to conduct the NDMS Pilot Program to improve the interoperability, special capabilities, and patient capacity of the NDMS. The pilot's first phase was the Military-Civilian NDMS Interoperability Study, designed to identify broad themes to direct further NDMS research. Researchers conducted a series of facilitated discussions with 49 key NDMS federal and civilian (private sector) stakeholders to identify and assess weaknesses and opportunities for improving the NDMS. After qualitative analysis, 6 critical themes emerged: (1) coordination, collaboration, and communication between federal and private sector NDMS partners; (2) funding and incentives for improved surge capacity and preparedness for NDMS partners; (3) staffing capacity and competencies for government and private NDMS partners; (4) surge capacity, especially at private sector healthcare facilities; (5) training, education, and exercises and knowledge sharing between federal and private sector NDMS partners; and (6) metrics, benchmarks, and modeling for NDMS partners to track their NDMS-related capabilities and performance. These findings provide a roadmap for federal-level changes and additional operations research to strengthen the NDMS definitive care system, particularly in the areas of policy and legislation, operational coordination, and funding.


Subject(s)
Disaster Planning , Disasters , Military Personnel , Carbolines , Communication , Disaster Planning/methods , Humans
3.
J Drugs Dermatol ; 20(1): 10-16, 2021 01 01.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2255393

ABSTRACT

The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) has served as a call-to-arms in preparing practices for the next disaster whether it is another infectious disease or a flood, hurricane, earthquake, a sustained power outage, or something else. A group of predominantly core aesthetic physicians discussed the various aspects of their office procedures that warrant consideration in a proactive approach to the next pandemic/disaster-related event. This guide does not set a standard of practice but contains recommendations that may avoid some of the "lessons learned" with the COVID-19 pandemic. In this paper, the board-certified core aesthetic physicians classified these recommendations into four generalized areas: Practice Management; Supplies and Inventory; Office Staffing Considerations and Protocols; and Patient Management Strategies. Proactive strategies are provided in each of these categories that, if implemented, may alleviate the processes involved with an efficient office closure and reopening process including, in the case of COVID-19, methods to reduce the risk of transmission to doctors, staff, and patients. These strategies also include being prepared for emergency-related notifications of employees and patients; the acquisition of necessary equipment and supplies such as personal protective equipment; and the maintenance and accessibility of essential data and contact information for patients, vendors, financial advisors, and other pertinent entities.J Drugs Dermatol. 2021;20(1):10-16. doi:10.36849/JDD.5803.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/prevention & control , Civil Defense/methods , Disaster Planning/methods , Disasters/prevention & control , Disease Management , Physician's Role , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/therapy , Civil Defense/trends , Disaster Planning/trends , Humans , Personnel Staffing and Scheduling/trends
4.
Disaster Med Public Health Prep ; 17: e355, 2023 03 15.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2271646

ABSTRACT

During health emergencies, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, systematic evaluation of capabilities, and multisector coordination are challenging while operating in triage mode. During Action Review and Tabletop (DART) identifies recommendations for strengthening readiness and resiliency by creating a single methodology integrating retrospective analysis of the response to date with a prospective analysis of future scenarios. DART utilizes a role-based questionnaire and participant-led discussion for retrospective response review and identification of future scenarios of concern. Tabletop exercises exploring those future scenarios are conducted in a multi-role format to assess readiness and resiliency. Participants evaluate findings to determine recommended actions to improve response capabilities. 3 COVID-19 focused DARTs demonstrated the ability of this participant-led approach to systematically assess, not only readiness for today, but also resiliency to future complications. While demonstrating its usefulness during COVID-19, DART's flexible and modular design promises to be an effective for any ongoing health emergency.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Civil Defense , Disaster Planning , Humans , Disaster Planning/methods , Retrospective Studies , Pandemics , COVID-19/epidemiology
5.
JAMA ; 328(16): 1585-1586, 2022 10 25.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2084336

ABSTRACT

This Viewpoint discusses 3 areas in need of progress regarding societal approaches to pandemics and other health threats: a renaissance in public health; robustness of primary health care; and resilience of individuals and communities, with higher levels of trust in government and society.


Subject(s)
Disaster Planning , Pandemics , Public Health , Quality Improvement , Humans , COVID-19/prevention & control , Pandemics/prevention & control , Public Health/methods , Public Health/standards , SARS-CoV-2 , Quality Improvement/standards , Disaster Planning/methods , Disaster Planning/standards
7.
PLoS One ; 17(2): e0261904, 2022.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1674004

ABSTRACT

The need for resilient health systems is recognized as important for the attainment of health outcomes, given the current shocks to health services. Resilience has been defined as the capacity to "prepare and effectively respond to crises; maintain core functions; and, informed by lessons learnt, reorganize if conditions require it". There is however a recognized dichotomy between its conceptualization in literature, and its application in practice. We propose two mutually reinforcing categories of resilience, representing resilience targeted at potentially known shocks, and the inherent health system resilience, needed to respond to unpredictable shock events. We determined capacities for each of these categories, and explored this methodological proposition by computing country-specific scores against each capacity, for the 47 Member States of the WHO African Region. We assessed face validity of the computed index, to ensure derived values were representative of the different elements of resilience, and were predictive of health outcomes, and computed bias-corrected non-parametric confidence intervals of the emergency preparedness and response (EPR) and inherent system resilience (ISR) sub-indices, as well as the overall resilience index, using 1000 bootstrap replicates. We also explored the internal consistency and scale reliability of the index, by calculating Cronbach alphas for the various proposed capacities and their corresponding attributes. We computed overall resilience to be 48.4 out of a possible 100 in the 47 assessed countries, with generally lower levels of ISR. For ISR, the capacities were weakest for transformation capacity, followed by mobilization of resources, awareness of own capacities, self-regulation and finally diversity of services respectively. This paper aims to contribute to the growing body of empirical evidence on health systems and service resilience, which is of great importance to the functionality and performance of health systems, particularly in the context of COVID-19. It provides a methodological reflection for monitoring health system resilience, revealing areas of improvement in the provision of essential health services during shock events, and builds a case for the need for mechanisms, at country level, that address both specific and non-specific shocks to the health system, ultimately for the attainment of improved health outcomes.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/prevention & control , Delivery of Health Care/standards , Disaster Planning/methods , Health Resources/statistics & numerical data , Health Services Needs and Demand , Medical Assistance/standards , Resilience, Psychological , Africa/epidemiology , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/transmission , COVID-19/virology , Humans , Reproducibility of Results , SARS-CoV-2/isolation & purification , World Health Organization
14.
Asian Pac J Cancer Prev ; 22(9): 2945-2950, 2021 Sep 01.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1441449

ABSTRACT

The COVID-pandemic has shown significant impact on cancer care from early detection, management plan to clinical outcomes of cancer patients. The Asian National Cancer Centres Alliance (ANCCA) has put together the 9 "Ps" as guidelines for cancer programs to better prepare for the next pandemic. The 9 "Ps" are Priority, Protocols and Processes, Patients, People, Personal Protective Equipments (PPEs), Pharmaceuticals, Places, Preparedness, and Politics. Priority: to maintain cancer care as a key priority in the health system response even during a global infectious disease pandemic. Protocol and processes: to develop a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and have relevant expertise to man the Disease Outbreak Response (DORS) Taskforce before an outbreak. Patients: to prioritize patient safety in the event of an outbreak and the need to reschedule cancer management plan, supported by tele-consultation and use of artificial intelligence technology. People: to have business continuity planning to support surge capacity. PPEs and Pharmaceuticals: to develop plan for stockpiles management, build local manufacturing capacity and disseminate information on proper use and reduce wastage. Places: to design and build cancer care facilities to cater for the need of triaging, infection control, isolation and segregation. Preparedness: to invest early on manpower building and technology innovations through multisectoral and international collaborations. Politics: to ensure leadership which bring trust, cohesion and solidarity for successful response to pandemic and mitigate negative impact on the healthcare system.


Subject(s)
Cancer Care Facilities/organization & administration , Disaster Planning/methods , Infection Control/methods , Neoplasms/prevention & control , Pandemics/prevention & control , Regional Health Planning/organization & administration , Telemedicine/methods , Artificial Intelligence , Asia/epidemiology , Delivery of Health Care , Humans , Neoplasms/epidemiology
15.
Viruses ; 13(8)2021 08 13.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1376992

ABSTRACT

While investigating a signal of adaptive evolution in humans at the gene LARGE, we encountered an intriguing finding by Dr. Stefan Kunz that the gene plays a critical role in Lassa virus binding and entry. This led us to pursue field work to test our hypothesis that natural selection acting on LARGE-detected in the Yoruba population of Nigeria-conferred resistance to Lassa Fever in some West African populations. As we delved further, we conjectured that the "emerging" nature of recently discovered diseases like Lassa fever is related to a newfound capacity for detection, rather than a novel viral presence, and that humans have in fact been exposed to the viruses that cause such diseases for much longer than previously suspected. Dr. Stefan Kunz's critical efforts not only laid the groundwork for this discovery, but also inspired and catalyzed a series of events that birthed Sentinel, an ambitious and large-scale pandemic prevention effort in West Africa. Sentinel aims to detect and characterize deadly pathogens before they spread across the globe, through implementation of its three fundamental pillars: Detect, Connect, and Empower. More specifically, Sentinel is designed to detect known and novel infections rapidly, connect and share information in real time to identify emerging threats, and empower the public health community to improve pandemic preparedness and response anywhere in the world. We are proud to dedicate this work to Stefan Kunz, and eagerly invite new collaborators, experts, and others to join us in our efforts.


Subject(s)
Disaster Planning , Lassa Fever/epidemiology , Lassa virus/physiology , Africa, Western/epidemiology , Disaster Planning/methods , Humans , Lassa Fever/genetics , Lassa Fever/prevention & control , Lassa Fever/virology , Lassa virus/genetics , N-Acetylglucosaminyltransferases/genetics , N-Acetylglucosaminyltransferases/immunology , Nigeria/epidemiology , Pandemics , Polymorphism, Genetic , Receptors, Virus/genetics , Receptors, Virus/immunology
18.
PLoS Pathog ; 17(6): e1009583, 2021 06.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1256050

ABSTRACT

The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic reveals a major gap in global biosecurity infrastructure: a lack of publicly available biological samples representative across space, time, and taxonomic diversity. The shortfall, in this case for vertebrates, prevents accurate and rapid identification and monitoring of emerging pathogens and their reservoir host(s) and precludes extended investigation of ecological, evolutionary, and environmental associations that lead to human infection or spillover. Natural history museum biorepositories form the backbone of a critically needed, decentralized, global network for zoonotic pathogen surveillance, yet this infrastructure remains marginally developed, underutilized, underfunded, and disconnected from public health initiatives. Proactive detection and mitigation for emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) requires expanded biodiversity infrastructure and training (particularly in biodiverse and lower income countries) and new communication pipelines that connect biorepositories and biomedical communities. To this end, we highlight a novel adaptation of Project ECHO's virtual community of practice model: Museums and Emerging Pathogens in the Americas (MEPA). MEPA is a virtual network aimed at fostering communication, coordination, and collaborative problem-solving among pathogen researchers, public health officials, and biorepositories in the Americas. MEPA now acts as a model of effective international, interdisciplinary collaboration that can and should be replicated in other biodiversity hotspots. We encourage deposition of wildlife specimens and associated data with public biorepositories, regardless of original collection purpose, and urge biorepositories to embrace new specimen sources, types, and uses to maximize strategic growth and utility for EID research. Taxonomically, geographically, and temporally deep biorepository archives serve as the foundation of a proactive and increasingly predictive approach to zoonotic spillover, risk assessment, and threat mitigation.


Subject(s)
Biological Specimen Banks/organization & administration , Communicable Disease Control , Communicable Diseases, Emerging/prevention & control , Community Networks/organization & administration , Public Health Surveillance/methods , Animals , Animals, Wild , Biodiversity , Biological Specimen Banks/standards , Biological Specimen Banks/supply & distribution , Biological Specimen Banks/trends , COVID-19/epidemiology , Communicable Disease Control/methods , Communicable Disease Control/organization & administration , Communicable Disease Control/standards , Communicable Diseases, Emerging/epidemiology , Communicable Diseases, Emerging/microbiology , Communicable Diseases, Emerging/virology , Community Networks/standards , Community Networks/supply & distribution , Community Networks/trends , Disaster Planning/methods , Disaster Planning/organization & administration , Disaster Planning/standards , Geography , Global Health/standards , Global Health/trends , Humans , Medical Countermeasures , Pandemics/prevention & control , Public Health , Risk Assessment , SARS-CoV-2/physiology , Zoonoses/epidemiology , Zoonoses/prevention & control
19.
Med Klin Intensivmed Notfmed ; 117(4): 289-296, 2022 May.
Article in German | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1193127

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: During the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, outbreaks in inpatient care facilities, which grow into a large-scale emergency scenario, are frequently observed. A standardized procedure analogous to algorithms for mass casualty incidents (MCI) is lacking. METHODS: Based on a case report and the literature, the authors present a management strategy for infectious MCI during the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic and distinguish it from traumatic MCI deployment tactics. RESULTS: This management strategy can be divided into three phases, beginning with the acute emergency response including triage, stabilization of critical patients, and transport of patients requiring hospitalization. Phase 2 involves securing the facility's operational readiness, or housing residents elsewhere in case staff are infected or quarantined to a relevant degree. Phase 3 marks the return to regular operations. DISCUSSION: Phase 1 is based on usual MCI principles, phase 2 on hospital crisis management. Avoiding evacuation of residents to relieve hospitals is an important operational objective. The lack of mission and training experience with such situations, the limited applicability of established triage algorithms, and the need to coordinate a large number of participants pose challenges. CONCLUSION: This strategic model offers a practical, holistic approach to the management of infectious mass casualty scenarios in nursing facilities.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Disaster Planning , Emergency Medical Services , Mass Casualty Incidents , Disaster Planning/methods , Emergency Medical Services/methods , Humans , Retirement , SARS-CoV-2 , Triage/methods
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